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Abstract 
 
The principle of “non-reciprocity” in international trade negotiations, together 
with the concept of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) for developing 
countries (DCs), were considered by the latter at the time to have been some of their 
important achievements in the 1950s and 1960s. Non-reciprocity indicated 
recognition by the international community that playing fields between developed and 
developing countries are not level. In order to provide some kind of parity advanced 
countries (ACs) were urged to give access to their markets to DCs without requiring 
them to open their own markets to AC goods on a reciprocal basis. 
 The evolution of the doctrine of S&DT had its ups and downs during the 
various rounds of trade negotiations in the post-war period. In the event, in the 
important 2001 Doha ministerial declaration the concept of S&DT received an 
unqualified endorsement from the ministers. The main purpose of this paper is to look 
afresh at the concept of S&DT and revisit its economic rationale in the current context 
of the world economy. Unlike many advanced country evaluations and studies, which 
take a generally negative view of S&DT in terms of its benefits either to the DCs or to 
the multilateral trading system, this chapter presents a rather different view. It 
acknowledges the failure of some current and previous approaches to S&DT but 
nevertheless argues that the full support of S&DT by ministers at Doha provides a 
basis for working toward realising the inherent potential of S&DT for economic 
development.  
 3
 
 
Elements for a New Paradigm on Special and Differential Treatment 
  
Special and Differential Treatment, the Multilateral Trading System and 
Economic Development in the 21st Century,  
 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
The principle of “non-reciprocity” in international trade negotiations, together with 
the concept of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) for developing countries 
(DCs), were considered by the latter at the time to have been some of their important 
achievements in the 1950s and 1960s. Non-reciprocity indicated recognition by the 
international community that playing fields between developed and developing 
countries are not level.1 In order to provide some kind of parity advanced countries 
(ACs) were urged to give access to their markets to DCs without requiring them to 
open their own markets to AC goods on a reciprocal basis. 
 
 
The doctrine of S&DT is normally associated with the name of Dr Raul Prebisch, the 
first Secretary-General of UNCTAD, and with the establishment of UNCTAD itself in 
1964 as an international organization.2 S&DT was in keeping with the spirit of the 
age in that it was intended to promote the then widely favoured strategy of import 
substitution industrialization. The acceptance by ACs of these concepts of non-
reciprocity and S&DT permitted DCs to pursue their economic development under 
protection whilst enjoying all the privileges and advantages of the multilateral trading 
system.   
                                                 
1 Even large firms from DCs are severely handicapped when they compete with large AC firms, 
usually multinationals, many of whom have long been active in international trade and investment.  DC 
firms are subject to infrastructural deficits, many missing or incomplete markets, lack of integration 
with the small and medium sized firms, and much higher costs of capital.  It is important to note that 
atypical AC multinational’s average costs of production may be lower than those of a DC large firm 
not because the former enjoys economies of scale and scope, but because it is a monopolistic buyer and 
seller in many of its markets.  Similarly, DC firms do not have brand names or marketing infrastructure 
and skills compared with the giant AC firms.  To compensate for such structural deficits of DC firms – 
and there are myriad such deficits in other areas as well which also impinge on competitiveness – they 
were given the privilege of preferential access to AC markets without being asked for reciprocal access 
in DC markets. 
2 Many people identify the S&DT concept with the formulation of the General System of Preferences 
(GSPs) which was done at UNCTAD.  However, the concept itself pre-dates GSPs. 
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S&DT was reaffirmed at the Tokyo meeting of GATT in 1973 and DCs took full 
advantage of it in the Tokyo Round of tariff cutting during 1974-79, i.e. they mostly 
did not cut their tariffs. However, in the 1980s, under the intellectual assault of 
neoliberalism, import substitution became a byword for inefficiency and consequently 
S&DT for DCs fell from favour both in the eyes of the international financial 
institutions and developing countries themselves. Nevertheless, for various reasons 
the S&DT principle was not abandoned in the subsequent multilateral trade 
negotiations. The 1986 Punta del Este ministerial declaration inaugurating the 
Uruguay Round again re-affirmed this principle in the following terms:  
 
‘Contracting Parties agree that the principle of differential and more favorable 
treatment embodied in Part IV and other relevant provisions of the General 
Agreement …applies to the negotiations … [D]eveloped countries do not 
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to 
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of developing countries 
(GATT,1986:7).’3
 
 
The S&DT principle is therefore deeply embedded in the WTO Agreements which 
came into being in 1994 at the end of the Uruguay Round. It has been given a further 
fillip by the DOHA ministerial meeting in 2001. Paragraph 44 of the ministerial 
declaration stated: 
 
‘We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are an 
integral part of the WTO Agreements. We note the concerns expressed 
regarding their operation in addressing specific constraints faced by 
developing countries, particularly least-developed countries. In that 
connection, we also note that some Members have proposed a Framework 
Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment (WT/GC/W/442). We 
therefore agree that all special and differential treatment provisions shall be 
reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, 
effective and operational. In this connection, we endorse the work programme 
                                                 
3 Quoted in Hoeckman and Kostecki (2001). On the reasons for the reaffirmation of S&DT in the 
Uruguay round see further South Center (1999), Kessie (2000) and Fukasaku (2000). Tables 1-3 in 
Whalley (1999) provide an excellent account of the evolution of non-reciprocity and S&DT during the 
last four decades. 
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on special and differential treatment set out in the Decision on 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.’ 
 
Paragraph 14 of the declaration also stipulated that: 
 
‘Modalities for the further commitments, including provisions for special and 
differential treatment, shall be established no later than 31 March 2003.’4
 
In February 2002, the Trade Negotiating Committee of the WTO agreed that the 
mandate from paragraph 44 (referred to above) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
should be negotiated in the Committee on Trade and Development  (CTD) in Special 
Sessions.   CTD has, accordingly, met in such sessions but there has been a wide gulf 
and a deadlock between DCs and ACs. The deadline for completing these tasks has 
been repeatedly extended but there has been little progress in the negotiations. Serious 
commentators suggest that this deadlock threatens the entire negotiating process 
under the DOHA Round.5   
 
The main purpose of this paper is to look afresh at the concept of S&DT and revisit its 
economic rationale in the current context of the world economy. Unlike many AC 
evaluations and studies which take a generally negative view of S&DT in terms of its 
benefits either to the DCs or to the multilateral trading system, this paper presents a 
rather different view. It acknowledges the failure of some current and previous 
approaches to S&DT but nevertheless it argues that the unqualified endorsement of 
S&DT by the ministers at Doha provides a basis for working towards realizing the 
inherent potential of S&DT for economic development.  Specifically it is argued here 
that important impediments to economic development are represented by certain 
articles and clauses of the WTO Agreements themselves.  It is a strange irony that 
                                                 
4 Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration is the main, central mandate on S&DT, but it is not 
the only one. It is reinforced by paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Decision on Implementation Issues that 
defines: (i) what the CTD has to do, i.e. the scope of the mandate; (ii) the place of the S&D issues in 
the single undertaking; and (iii) the crucial link between the S&D issue and the pending 
implementation issues. Another key element of the Doha mandate on S&D is contained in paragraph 
50 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, that sets the legal framework of the negotiation on S&D, i.e. it 
reiterates the legal (i.e. binding) value of the relevant WTO texts. The divergent interpretation of these 
three provisions altogether is what generates the obstacles in the current negotiations.  
There are other "S&DT-like" mandates in the Doha texts, expressed in a variety of S&DT or "pro-
development language: for instance, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health; paragraphs.16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 51, plus the 
Decision on Implementation.  I am grateful to Werner Corrales and Manuela Tortora for this point. 
5 For a review of the progress on S&DT following the DOHA meeting see Tortora (2002), Mangeni 
(2002a&b), ICTSD.BRIDGES Weekly, Melamed (2003). 
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apart from all the normal structural reasons for seeking special and differential 
treatment, parts of the Agreements now constitute an important additional reason for 
seeking S&DT for DCs.  The paper suggests, however, that in order for it to meet the 
developmental needs of DCs, a fresh and broader conceptualization of S&DT would 
be required than is available under the current Agreements of the WTO.  It is further 
argued that this new S&DT conceptualization would not only be of benefit to 
developing countries but would also serve the long-term interests of developed 
countries. Such S&DT architecture would be Pareto optimal in the present and 
prospective circumstances of the world economy.   
 
Apart from its significance for developing countries, S&DT also provides an 
opportunity for the multilateral trading system to regain the necessary public 
legitimacy which it has evidently lost in the recent period (Ricupero 2000).  For this 
to happen, the fresh thinking on these issues should aim to bring to the forefront the 
overarching environmental and developmental goals of the multilateral trading 
systems.  
 
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization states at the very outset:  
 The Parties to this Agreement, 
‘Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods, and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in 
a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different 
levels of economic development. (WTO 1995:9) 
 
The above passage may be regarded as being effectively the mission statement of the 
WTO. The restoration of public confidence of the civil society in the organization will 
only come if is seen to be actively engaged in fulfilling is own laudable mission 
objectives. 
 
This paper is in two parts.  Part I discusses the analytical and policy issues which 
arise from examining S&DT provisions in WTO Agreements in the light of the Doha 
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Declaration.  This part of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief 
history and legal basis of S&DT provisions in multilateral trade agreements.  Section 
III outlines the main issues which arise in examining the economic case for S&DT in 
the contemporary international economy.  In this and the following sections (IV-VIII) 
the claim that the best way to promote economic development is to integrate as 
quickly as possible with the multilateral trading system under the WTO Agreements 
is examined in some detail.  The paper puts forward the concept of the optimal degree 
of openness of an economy from a developmental perspective and argues that this 
varies between countries.  It is suggested in that context that the “single undertaking” 
requirement of the WTO Agreements is not very helpful.  The evidence from the 
historical experience of East Asian countries, China, India, Latin America and Africa 
is analyzed to suggest the difficulties created by provisions of the WTO Agreements 
for economic development.  Section VIII also examines inter alia the use of 
effectively S&DT measures by several advanced countries during the period of the 
Golden Age of 1950 to 1973.  The advanced country examples illustrate the inherent 
potential of S&DT for economic development.  Section IX sums up the main findings 
of Part I.   
 
Part II (Sections X – XIV) considers issues of economic policy.  It outlines alternative 
policy approaches to S&DT (Section X), and comments on the characteristics of a 
development friendly WTO regime (Section XI).  Section XII provides a detailed 
analysis of the vexed issue of graduation and differentiation.  It finds the North’s 
obsession with graduation and differentiation in relation to S&DT to be a mercantilist 
misconception with little economic justification.  Section XIII considers the S&DT 
question within the broader context of the global economy and pays particular 
attention to the relationship between trade liberalization and financial liberalization.  
Section XIV concludes, outlining the main policy concerns of developing countries in 
relation to S&DT and the WTO Agreements. 
 
 
II  The Evolution of S&DT Provisions and their Legal Basis 
 
Over the years, there has been a whole plethora of S&DT provisions intended to help 
developing countries to benefit from the multilateral trading system. WTO (2000) 
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records that there are 145 such provisions spread across the different Multilateral 
Agreements: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services; The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property; 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements of Disputes; 
and various Ministerial Decisions. Of the 145 provisions, 107 were adopted at the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and 22 apply to least-developed country Members 
only. 
 
Whalley (1999) makes a useful distinction between S&DT provisions adopted before 
the Uruguay Round and those adopted subsequently. The former were crafted to 
provide market access for developing countries in advanced countries’ markets on a 
preferential and non-reciprocal basis.  The post -Uruguay Round S&DT measures 
have been of a different kind. Their main concern appears to be to assist developing 
countries in implementing the WTO disciplines. Thus, developing countries were 
offered extra time, technical assistance to enhance capacity, all in order to facilitate 
their adjustment into the new World Trading System. The WTO secretariat has 
developed a six-fold typology to classify the existing S&DT provisions. 
 
1) provisions aimed at increasing the trade opportunities of developing country 
Members; 
2) provisions under which WTO Members should safeguard the interests of 
developing country Members; 
3) flexibility of commitments, of actions, and use of policy instruments; 
4) transitional time periods; 
5) technical assistance; 
6) provisions relating to least-developed country Members. 
 
GP and ICTSD (2003) suggest that these categories can be related to two 
development dimensions: 
i) Market access and fair competition in favour of developing 
countries; 
ii) “Spaces for development policies”, i.e., extent to which S&DT 
measures enhance the capacity and the policy autonomy of 
 9
developing countries in meeting their developmental needs and 
potential through trade. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the nature of the relationship between the WTO Secretariat’s 
classification of S&DT provisions and how these might translate into the two 
important channels above for achieving economic development.6
 
However, it is interesting to observe that the WTO’s categorization of S&DT 
measures has an extremely important omission. There are no S&DT provisions here 
that would enable DCs to overcome the anti-developmental impact of several parts 
of the WTO Agreements themselves. It will be difficult to maintain that the TRIPS, 
the TRIMS, as well as several other elements of the Agreements normally have, 
ceteris paribus, a positive impact on economic development(see further below). 
These provisions clearly should not have been accepted by DCs at the time of their 
accession. As explained in later sections, the acceptance reflects the economic and 
political weaknesses of DCs in the “lost decade” of the 1980s. These anti 
developmental features of WTO Agreements need to be re-negotiated and suitably 
amended if the Agreements are to serve the cause of development. The means by 
which this can be done would constitute a most important S&DT provision. 
 
WTO Agreements contain not only provisions which are not conducive to 
developmental interest of DCs, but also contain a number of element which can only 
be regarded as being S&DT in favor of ACs.  Textile quotas and agricultural support 
schemes are obvious examples in this context. Less obvious are the provisions with 
respect to TRIPs and TRIMs. Restrictions on competition are accepted under the  
 
TABLE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN S&DT PROVISIONS AND DIMENSIONS 
ACCORDING TO DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA 
 
 
 
DIMENSION 
I: MARKET 
 
DIMENSION II. SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
POLICIES 
                                                 
6 I am indebted to Mr Werner Corrales for this table. 
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ENABLING 
FRAMEWORK FOR 
NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICIES 
FRAMEWORKS AND ACTIONS 
FOR COHERENT 
MULTILATERAL POLICIES 
EXISTING S&DT 
PROVISIONS, 
ACCORDING TO 
WTO 
SECRETARIAT’S 
CLASSIFICATION 
ACCESS  
AND TRADE 
FAIRNESS 
FOR 
DEVELOPIN
G 
COUNTRIES 
ACTIVE 
TRADE 
POLICIES 
SUPPLY-
SIDE 
ACTIVE 
POLICIES 
POSITIVE 
INTERNATIONAL 
MEASURES 
COHERENCE 
MULTILATERAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
PROVISIONS 
AIMING AT 
INCREASING 
TRADE 
OPPORTUNITIES 
OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY 
MEMBERS 
 
X 
    
PROVISIONS 
UNDER WHICH 
WTO MEMBERS 
SHOULD 
SAFEGUARD THE 
INTERESTS OF 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY 
MEMBERS 
 
X 
    
 
FLEXIBILITY OF 
COMMITMENTS, 
OF ACTIONS, AND 
USE OF POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
 
 
TRANSITIONAL 
TIME PERIODS 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
 
 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
PROVISIONS 
RELATED TO  LDCs 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
  
 
 
 
TRIPs Agreement, for example, in order presumably to promote technical change 
and long-term economic growth. However, since most patents are held by AC 
corporations and individuals, the Agreement promotes the interest of developed 
rather than DCs. 
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Similarly, the notion of industrial policy is implicit in the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures which does not prohibit government grants to private 
firms to promote R&D, or subsidies granted to disadvantaged regions, or those 
relating to new environmental laws. This rule again favors industrial policy 
requirements of advanced countries; many of the subsidies of interest from the 
perspective of industrial policy in DCs are ruled out, for example, prohibited 
subsidies include those contingent on export performance, or those given for the use 
of domestic in preference to imported products. 
 
Turning to the legal basis for the evolution of the S&DT provisions, at the beginning 
in 1947, Article XVIII of GATT was the only provision available for developing 
countries, for enhancing economic development. This was the infant industry 
protection clause. In 1954-55, this clause was modified to include XVIII:b on 
quantitative restrictions on imports in case of balance of payments difficulties 
encountered by developing countries. This provision was used by many developing 
countries until WTO agreements came into force in the 1990s. In 1965, a new Part 
IV was added to GATT, which introduced the concept of non-reciprocity for 
developing countries. One of the most important results of the Tokyo Round in the 
1970s was a framework agreement on “differential and a more favorable treatment, 
reciprocity and fuller participation of the developing countries”. This is also known 
as the Enabling Clause, which provided a permanent legal basis for the GSP scheme. 
 
One of the main difficulties in S&DT provisions in the WTO Agreements is that they 
are generally speaking voluntary and not legally binding. Part IV of GATT and most 
of the other S&DT measures in WTO Agreements are also voluntary and in the nature 
of “best endeavor” clauses. Kessie (2000) agues that “ much of the WTO provisions 
dealing with S&D treatment could be said to be unenforceable, as they are expressed 
in the imprecise and hortatory language (p.15)”. This poses a challenge for the legal 
experts.7 The nature of other legal and related political challenges that will follow 
from the substantive analysis of this paper will become clear in the following 
sections. 
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Finally, it is important to note that a large number of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) now exist side by side with the WTO Agreements.  The former vary in their 
scope, in coverage and in their provision of S&DT for DCs in their jurisdiction.  The 
most well known RTA is NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area comprising the 
U.S., Canada and Mexico), which has arguably more stringent disciplines for DCs 
than the WTO Agreements.8
  
 
 
III The economic rationale for S&DT in the contemporary international 
economy:  the main issues. 
 
A central analytical issue raised by the discussion so far of S&DT, the developmental 
objectives of the Doha Round as well as the Preambular paragraph of the WTO 
Agreements, is to what extent, if any, the multilateral trading system in its current 
form promotes or hinders economic development.  The proponents of the WTO 
suggest that trade liberalization and integration into the world economy is the best 
way for DCs to achieve economic development, and this is exactly the path the 
multilateral trading system of the WTO has been following. 
 
The WTO adherents, which includes not only the IFIs and other influential 
globalizers, normally support their case with the following kinds of subsidiary 
arguments:9
 
• The rate of growth of world trade has been twice the rate of production in the 
post-war period and that trade is therefore the engine of growth; 
• The failure of the Soviet Union indicates that dirigiste policies are 
inappropriate; 
                                                                                                                                            
7 This papers is primarily concerned with underlying economic issues rather than with legal principles.  
However, for an interesting recent paper on legal issues concerned with S&DT see Mangeni 2002a. 
8 On NAFTA and its implications for domestic policy autonomy in Mexico, see OXFAM (2002). 
9 The classic reference here is Sachs and Warner(1995).  For more recent studies see Prowse (2002) 
and Hoekman et.al (2003). See also Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1999) and Rodrik (1999). 
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• On the positive side, the experiences of Japan and East Asia indicate that 
export orientation, greater openness and integration with the world economy 
are the best means of achieving fast and equitable economic growth. 
 
It is further suggested that developing countries would be better off abandoning 
S&DT altogether and integrating themselves quickly into the international economy.  
S&DT is regarded as being ineffective and, in any case, is likely to delay the 
necessary market-oriented pro-competition economic reforms that are necessary.  
Essentially, the basic development philosophy of the WTO consists of two main 
elements:  (a) trade liberalization and greater integration with the world economy; (b) 
increasing the role of the market and diminishing that of the state (as exemplified by 
TRIMS, abolition of state aid to subsidize industry, etc). 
 
Thus, the case of the proponents of WTO and its current policies is multi-faceted and 
seemingly formidable.  However, on close examination, it will be seen to be deeply 
flawed.  The readers will recognize that the above line of reasoning is enshrined in the 
Washington Consensus which in recent years has lost much of its lustre and is being 
rapidly abandoned even by former adherents.  (However, this issue is discussed 
further in Part II below.) 
 
Nevertheless, in view of the hold of these arguments in influential circles in the WTO 
and elsewhere, these will be fully reviewed here in the light of the latest available 
research.  It will be suggested that trade liberalization and globalization are far from 
being the best ways, let alone the only ways, of promoting economic development. 
From the perspective of economic development there is an optimal degree of 
openness for each country which does not necessarily coincide with either free trade 
or with free capital movements, and it is proposed that each country should have 
policy autonomy to choose its optimal level of openness.  Indeed the intellectual case 
for suitable S&DT for countries at different levels of development and different 
circumstances is overwhelming. These propositions and proposals are systematically 
examined in the next three sections. 
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IV Liberal multilateral trading system and economic development:  
analytical considerations.10
 
The traditional case for free trade can best be put in terms of the two fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics.  According to the first welfare theorem, a competitive 
equilibrium in the absence of externalities and non-satiation constitutes a Pareto 
optimum.  The second theorem, which is more relevant for present purposes, states 
that any Pareto optimum can be realized as a competitive equilibrium in the presence 
of all-around convexity, provided suitable lump-sum transfers can be arranged among 
the participants.  Most of these assumptions are unrealistic in relation to the real 
world that does not always display all-around convexity and where externalities do 
matter.11 Nevertheless, neo-classical economists suggest that such considerations do 
not destroy the case for free trade but only change the nature of the argument. Thus, 
Krugman (1987) concludes his classic defense of free trade in terms of modern theory 
as follows: "this is not the argument that free trade is optimal because markets are 
efficient.  Instead it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of thumb in 
a world whose politics are as imperfect as its markets."   
 
However, as Chakravarty and Singh (1988) suggest, the politics of a world of 
increasing returns to scale are more likely to make it gravitate towards ‘managed’ 
rather than free trade.  Instead of either free trade or autarchy, this would be a world 
in between – one in which there were trade restrictions, government assistance to 
favoured industries and a plethora of special arrangements between countries, in other 
words, the messy real world.  In place of all-around convexity, this real world is 
characterized by learning by doing (Arrow, 1962), dynamic economies and 
cumulative causation (Young, 1928; Kaldor 1978).  This is, therefore, the world of 
second best and of multiple equilibria and the purpose of policy is to move from a bad 
                                                 
10 This section draws on Chakravarty and Singh (1988). 
11 The traditional theory of comparative advantage assumes, inter alia, constant or decreasing returns 
to scale and full employment.  There is, however, considerable evidence in the real world of increasing 
returns arising from the static, Kaldor’s dynamic and Young’s macro-economic economies of scale as 
well as of widespread externalities.  The ‘new’ trade theory’s response to these problems has been, as 
Ocampo and Taylor (2000) put it “to muffle the impact of scale economies by ‘convexifying’ 
assumptions”.  They note, for example the “Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic 
competition in which firms’ profitability gains from returns to scale are strictly limited by consumers’ 
desires for product diversity.” 
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to a good equilibrium.  The gains from such policy intervention have, however, to be 
balanced against the losses from government failure and appropriate policy can 
therefore be prescribed only on a case-by-case basis (Ocampo and Taylor, 2000; 
Gomery and Baumol, 2000).  Provided there is a mechanism for ensuring full 
employment of each nation’s resources so that there are gains from trade to be 
realized, and if we abstract, for the moment, from the possibility of government 
failure, Chakravarty and Singh suggest that a policy of selective economic openness 
may be a source of great advantage for an economy for any one of the following 
reasons:12    
 
(a) it may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialized resources in areas 
of production where the world demand is highly income and price elastic; 
(b) it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of a nature which can lead to considerable 
upgradation of the quality of local factors of production; 
(c) it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate X-inefficiency; 
(d) trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to a 
greater share of accumulation in national income; 
(e) trade may facilitate what Schumpeter stressed so much: an accelerated process of 
creative destruction. 
 
In general, such trade openness works positively if the phenomenon of "learning" 
from contacts with the rest of the world are institutionalized through suitable 
adaptations on the policy side involving appropriate government interventions 
which make the domestic economy more responsive to change.  This is a main 
lesson that emerges from the outstanding industrial success of East Asian 
economies during the second half of the 20th century as we shall see in the next 
section.13   
 
To sum up, while neoclassical arguments for "free trade" suffer from serious 
conceptual and operational difficulties, there are indeed substantive benefits from 
                                                 
12   Such a mechanism, for example, existed in the “Golden Age” of the post-WWII era (1950-1973) 
when, under the aegis of a single hegemonic economic power, namely the U.S., European economies 
were able to maintain high levels of aggregate demand to ensure full employment (Glyn et al., 1990; 
Singh, 1995a). 
13 See further Freeman (1989); Chang  (1994); Singh (1995b), Amsden (2001). 
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selective trade or economic openness, which are more robust than the traditional 
neoclassical theory suggests.  However, such benefits can be realized only in a world 
in which there is full employment in all trading nations, coupled with an appropriate 
set of domestic policies which go considerably beyond the limits of commercial 
policy as traditionally defined.   
 
V Strategic versus close integration with the World Economy: The East 
Asian Experience 
 
It used to be customary for International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and orthodox 
economists to ascribe East Asia’s outstanding economic success during the last four 
decades to (a) their close integration with the world economy;  (b) competition and 
economic efficiency; (c) to government’s market friendly approach which suggested 
that the government intervened in these countries sparingly, only to provide 
infrastructure and human capital for private enterprise to flourish. The export success 
of East Asian countries underlined their competitiveness. Overall, in the IFI’s view, 
the experience of these countries is thought to show how orthodox economic policies 
can bring fast GDP growth.14
 
Recently, the IFIs have re-evaluated their analysis of East Asian success in the wake 
of the Asian crisis. Their new conclusion is that that the crisis was caused in part by 
too much government intervention in these economies and by the lack of competition 
which led to over investment, collapse of profits and ultimately to the crisis.15
 
The above version of the IFI’s East Asian analysis is comprehensively rejected by 
independent scholars. The broad consensus view is that the governments in East 
Asian countries did not intervene reluctantly or sparingly but followed a vigorous 
industrial policy by which they attempted to change the vectors of prices and costs 
facing enterprises in the direction desired by the planners.  The government 
intervened not only at the broad sectoral levels but also at the level of the individual 
firm, favoring companies which accepted its strategic plans.  These interventions were 
                                                 
14 The classic references here are World Bank (1991,1993) 
15 See IMF (1997); Summers(1998) 
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normally carried out by the so-called administrative guidance rather than explicit 
legislation.16
 
To make the discussion more specific, the instruments of industrial and export 
promotion policies used either by Japan or by the Republic of Korea during their 
periods of rapid economic growth – the former country from 1950 to 1973 and the 
latter during the 1960s and the 1970s – can be summed up as follows:17
 
 Export Promotion and import restriction: 
 
(ii) Import restrictions, both general and specific; 
(iii) Favouring particular sectors for export promotion and in some 
cases particular firms for that purpose; 
(iv) Seeking compliance for subsidies given to exporters by means of 
export targets for specific firms (the Korean case); 
(v) Interest rate subsidies and the availability of credit and foreign 
exchange to favoured firms that meet export targets; 
(vi) General export promotion, in Japan through JETRO (Japan Export 
Trade Promotion Organization) and in the Republic of Korea via 
KOTRA (Korean Trade Promotion Organization); 
(vii) Provision of infrastructure, including human capital, in support of 
exports; 
(viii) Taxation relief on imported inputs and on R & D expenditures; 
(ix) Allowing favoured conglomerates to import capital goods and 
foreign technology and to raise cheaper finance on international 
markets. 
 
Industrial policy measures 
 
                                                 
16 See Singh(1994,1997,1998); Amsden(1994); Lall(1995);Singh and Weisse(1999).  For differing 
perspectives on the causes, consequences and remedies of the financial crisis in East Asian countries, 
see three recent collections of araticles published by National Bureau of Economic Research:  Feldstein 
(2002), Dooley and Frankel (2002), Edwards and Frankel (2002). 
17 For information on Japan, see, among others, Okimoto (1989), Tsuru (1993); Caves and Uekusa 
(1976).  For the Republic of Korea see Amsden (1989), Chang (1994); Singh (1998) 
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(i) Lax enforcement of competition policy, including the extensive 
use of cartels;18 
(ii) Government creation and promotion of conglomerates (in the 
Republic of Korea);19 
(iii) Tax concessions to corporations to increase investment; 
(iv) Promotion of a close, long-term relationship between finance and 
industry which was critical to the implementation of the industrial 
policy;20 
(v) Labour repression to ensure labour peace in a period of gigantic 
structural change (this applies to Korea rather than to Japan);21 
(vi) Establishment of state industries to enhance industrial 
development (this again applies to the Republic of Korea rather 
than to Japan); 
(vii) Administrative guidance, used extensively in both countries. 
 
 Clearly, many of the above policies are prima facie in violation of the WTO 
Agreements, particularly in the areas of TRIMS, subsidies, and technology policy 
(TRIPS). It may, however, be argued that such policies had been implemented by 
many countries in Latin America as well but they have not been successful. This is 
clearly an important issue and will be taken up in Section VI below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Import-penetration in manufactures in advanced industrial countries: 
1961-1979.  
(Ratio of manufactured imports to GNP) 
 
     1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 
 
                                                 
18 See further Amsden and Singh (1994). 
19 See Chang (1994). 
20 Johnson et al. (1989). 
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United States of America 1.5 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.5 
United Kingdom  4.6 6.7 8.0 11.7 14.2 
Rest of EEC (9)  6.1 7.6 10.1 13.0 15.8 
Japan    1.8 1.5 2.2 3.0 2.4 
 
Source: CEPG (1979) 
 
Apart from industrial policy, it is important to emphasize, in the context of this paper, 
that the East Asian countries, contrary to the IFI view, did not have a close integration 
with the world economy. Rather, the degree of their integration can be regarded as 
being strategic but not close. Thus these countries had export-orientation but they 
extensively used selective as well as comprehensive import controls during the course 
of industrialization.  As Table 2 shows, as late as 1979 when Japan had been a 
member of OECD for nearly a decade and was therefore committed to more or less 
free trade, its manufactured imports as a proportion of GDP were just over two per 
cent.  The corresponding imports of European countries were several orders of 
magnitude higher.  Even the United States which, because of its continental size, has 
traditionally been relatively closed, had manufacturing imports nearly twice as high as 
those of Japan, relative to the respective GDPs in the two countries.  Clearly, Japan 
was using informal methods of controlling imports even well after it had become a 
leading world exporter of a whole range of manufacture products including cars and 
electronic goods of various kinds.22  Similarly, South Korea afforded protection to its 
fledgling car industry for nearly three decades, to reach a stage where it too became a 
major exporter of cars. 
 
East Asian countries’ selective openness is indicated not just by their being open to 
exports but not imports; in a number of other relevant spheres also a similar policy 
was adopted.  As is widely acknowledged both Korea and Japan during their high-
growth phases discouraged foreign direct investment.  This didn’t mean that they 
                                                                                                                                            
21 In the postwar period, Japan has cultivated an enterprise-based, in-house approach to labour unions, 
which has contributed to industrial peace.  See further You and Chang (1993). 
22 It is not unreasonable to infer informal import controls (possibly in the form of foreigners’ access to 
the complex Japanese retail network) being a cause of slow growth of Japanese imports. The Japanese 
GDP growth was, if anything, faster than that in the competitor countries.  This factor should have 
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were averse to technical change but rather that they thought that foreign direct 
investment was more expensive than licensing or other means of obtaining technology 
from abroad.  So the two countries were more open to imports of technology through 
scientific and technical interchange and through licensing than through FDI. 
 
The widely used policy of selective economic openness which the East Asian 
countries followed with spectacular results has been conceptualized by Chakravarty 
and Singh in the following terms.  They suggest that economic openness is a multi-
dimensional concept.  A country can be open, or not so open, with respect to trade, to 
finance, to migration, to educational, scientific and cultural exchange.  There is no 
economic theory that suggests that a country needs to be open in all dimensions at all 
times.  A policy of strategic openness enables a nation to be open in areas where it is 
in its interest to do so.  The optimal degree of economic openness will vary between 
countries depending on their previous history, level of economic development, the 
size of the country, their institutional development and on the nature of its 
comparative and competitive advantage. 
 
A striking feature of the WTO multilateral regime is that it does not generally permit 
the kind of diversity in international economic arrangements between countries which 
would be required if each country were to have its own optimal degree of openness.  
Under the “single undertaking” arrangement developing countries cannot opt out of 
some disciplines while accepting others: the Agreements as a whole have to be 
accepted by members.  Although some concessions are given to developing countries 
under S&DT they tend to be grossly inadequate and basically the same rules apply to 
countries at widely different levels of economic development and with widely 
different capabilities. Such rules are prima facie unfair and unjust, and, as we shall 
see below, also anti-development.  
 
VI Economic openness and the experience of China, India and other 
emerging countries. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
increased the rate of growth and the level of imports and not lowered it.  For a fuller discussion of 
these issues see further Singh (1995b) and Johnson et al. (1989). 
 21
Some of the fastest growing economies in the world for the last two decades have 
been the world’s most populous as well as amongst the world’s poorest countries, 
namely India and China.  The IFIs regularly claim credit for this fast economic 
growth on the basis of the alleged openness of the two countries to the world 
economy.  Openness is measured here in terms of the rate of growth of exports and 
imports.  It is argued that the fast economic growth in the two countries is due to their 
high rate of growth of trade, and that in the case of China, is also caused by FDI of 
which China has been a major recipient. 
 
There are, however, important difficulties with this line of reasoning.  Firstly, it is not 
correct to infer openness from just the rate of growth of trade.  This is because the 
growth of this variable does not just depend on import and export restrictions but also 
on the size of GDP and its rate of growth.  Thus the causation could easily be the 
other way around:  the faster the growth of GDP, the faster the growth of imports and 
exports. 
 
Apart from the question of causation, to which we shall return soon in another 
context, the Indian and Chinese story does not support the claims of the IFIs and 
kindred globalisers in other respects as well.  The Indian growth rate began to pick up 
in the 1980s whereas most of the “openness” reforms were not carried out until the 
early 1990s.  Similarly, both China and India, despite their fast growth of exports and 
imports, continued to have extensive import controls and capital controls, not 
withstanding the liberalization which these countries have carried out over the last 
two decades.  Thus, India still has one of the highest rates of average protection in the 
world.  Similarly, China, while being the largest receiver of foreign direct investment 
among developing countries during the last decade, maintains a wide range of capital 
controls.23  Table 3 provides information on the relative openness of capital account 
regimes in China, India and other selected DCs and ACs. 
 
 
                                                 
23 See further Rodrik(2001) 
Table 3.  Financial Openness in Selected Developed and Developing Countries, 1977 
Country    Indexa  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Openb 
Argentina    1.78 
Australia    1.77 
Canada     1.92  
Egypt     1.81 
France     1.73 
Japan     1.73 
Mexico     1.69 
Sweden     1.86 
United Kingdom   1.86 
United States    1.85 
Largely openc 
Croatia     1.54 
Honduras    1.56 
Philippines    1.59 
Turkey     1.52 
Partially closedd 
Chile     1.43 
China     1.37 
Czech Republic    1.48 
Ghana     1.43 
Indonesia    1.46 
Korea, Republic of   1.42 
Mozambique    1.41 
Russian Federation   1.43 
South Africa    1.44 
Thailand    1.46 
Largely closede 
Brazil     1.19 
Ethiopia    1.12 
India     1.20 
Malaysia    1.34 
Pakistan    1.31 
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a.  The Financial Openness Index scoring draws on the methodology originally developed by 
Quinn and Inclan (1997), and is based on information contained in IMF, Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1998. 
b.  Open:  Little or no regulation for outward or inward transactions, with a generally 
nondiscriminatory environment. 
c.  Largely open:  Some regulations are exercised on outward and inward transactions 
requiring documentary support but not governmental approval. 
d.  Partially closed:  Regulation with governmental approval required for outward and inward 
transactions and usually granted. 
e.  Largely closed:  Substantial restrictions, with governmental approval required but seldom 
granted for outward and inward transactions. 
 
Source: Dailami, M. (2000) “Managing Risks of Global Financial Market Integration”, 
in Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia. Adams, C., R.E. 
Litan, and M.Pomerleano (eds.) Brookings Institutions Press, Washington, DC. pp. 
458. 
  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Apart from India and China, the case of Latin America is also relevant to the debate 
about the virtues of a free multilateral trading system versus those of selected 
economic openness,  as well as to the broader discussion of the role of the state in the 
economy. The facts are that the Latin American countries from the end of the Second 
World War to 1980 generally followed dirigist and import substitution policies. 
However following the debt crisis in the 1980s they were persuaded by the 
international financial institutions (IFIS) to bring about a fundamental change and to 
adopt instead Washington Consensus policies of privatization, de-regulation, trade 
and financial liberalization24. However these policies have not worked.  The long-
                                                 
24 The IFIs ascribed the debt crisis to macro-economic mistakes of the Latin American governments 
and to their microeconomic inefficiencies, rent seeking and inappropriate resource allocation.  The 
latter were thought to arise from import substitution and the pervasive role of the state in the economy. 
Singh 1993, Taylor 1988, and  Fishlow 1991, strongly contested this thesis. They pointed out that the 
debt crisis was due to international economic forces over which developing countries had no control. It 
was noted that the financial contagion played a major role in the debt crisis. It was also observed that 
Brazil had a debt crisis even though it had better fundamentals than Korea and Korea did not have such 
a crisis. Williamson 1985 suggested that if Korea had been a Latin American country it too would have 
succumbed to the contagion.  
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term trend rate of growth in Latin American countries during the last fifteen years is 
half that these countries recorded during the bad old days of import substitution and 
interventionist industrial policy!. In the wake of the Latin American experience under 
the Washington Consensus policies it is widely acknowledged that the liberalization 
of trade and capital movements does not by itself lead to long-term economic growth.   
 
An important lesson from the experience of the Latin American countries during 
dirigist period and the East Asian countries (examined earlier) is that since developing 
countries have incomplete and missing markets, the state can play an important role in 
coordinating investment activity of firms through a robust industrial policy.  It can 
also help build the capabilities of domestic firms and enterprises until they are ready 
to compete in the world markets. Amsden (2001) however, suggests that state directed 
industrial policies have been successful only in those countries where the state has 
certain autonomy and has been able to set performance standards for the private sector 
in return for state aid. Many of the standards which developing countries have 
successfully used, for example, those relating to domestic content requirements and 
export targets have unfortunately been specifically prohibited under the WTO 
Agreements. These prohibitions add to the disadvantages of developing countries. 
 
 Finally and briefly  we turn to African countries. Broadly speaking the experience of 
African countries who have followed the liberalization policies under structural 
adjustment, has been if anything even worse than that of Latin America.  Many of 
these countries have long been under the IFI structural adjustment programmes but 
these have not led to sustainable long-term economic development. 
 
VII Econometric evidence on trade liberalization and long-term economic 
growth. 
 
There is a large literature which attempts to establish the nature of the causal 
relationship between trade liberalization and long-term economic growth.  The 
literature is vast and highly contentious. However, it has been recently 
comprehensively reviewed by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999).  The two authors have 
analyzed some of the leading studies on the subject which have purported to show that 
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trade liberalization causes long-term economic growth. Rodriquez and Rodrik’s 
analysis indicates that the results of these studies are not at all robust and are indeed 
quite shaky.  One general fault they find in this research is that openness is not 
measured directly but by a number of proxies, many of which are quite unsuitable.  
Specifically, measuring the degree of openness by a variable such as black-market 
premium (see the study of Sachs and Warner (1995)) is not legitimate.  Black-market 
premia reflect more the macro-economic disequilibria in the economy rather than how 
open the trade regime is.   
 
Dollar and Kraay’s (2000) influential study which purports to find a positive 
relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth is subject to some of 
the same limitations as Rodriguez and Rodrik found in the earlier studies they 
analyzed.  Dollar and Kraay measure openness by the growth of exports and imports 
rather than by the country’s commercial policy.  India, in this analysis, comes out as a 
liberalizer even though, as noted earlier, it has the highest average rate of protection 
in the world. 
 
Rodriguez and Rodrik’s other relevant result in the context of this paper is that trade 
liberalization does not lead to convergence but rather to divergence between 
countries25. 
 
VIII The Experience of Advanced Countries in the Golden Age 1950 - 1973:  
S&DT on a Grand Scale.26
 
In the debate on S&DT it is usually forgotten that European economic recovery and 
prosperity following the end of the Second World War depended to a large degree on 
what can only be called special and differential treatment accorded by the United 
States to Germany, Italy, Japan and other defeated as well as victor countries.  The 
period 1950 to 1973 is rightly regarded as the Golden Age of world capitalism, for 
during this period the OECD economy grew at twice its historic trend rate over the 
                                                 
25 For other important contributions to the debate about the relationship between trade and economic 
growth see Bhagwati and Srinivasan(1999) and Rodrik(1999). 
26 For a further analysis of the issues raised in this section see Glyn et al (1990) and Kindleberger 
(1992). 
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last two centuries.  Research suggests that an important element in this extraordinary 
epoch  in economic history was the far-sighted international economic policies 
pursued by the United States.  Analysis and evidence indicate that the United States, 
confronted with the challenge of a triumphant Soviet Union at the end of the war, 
adopted for strategic reasons long-term economic policies designed to build up fast 
the economies of western countries so that they would not fall under Soviet influence.  
The net result was not only the Marshall Plan for Europe but also non-reciprocity in 
relation to U.S. trade with the other now advanced countries.  As Spero (1977) notes: 
 
In the short-term, it [the U.S.] dealt with its own huge balance-of-trade 
surplus and the European and Japanese deficits by foreign aid and 
military expenditures.  In addition the United States abandoned the 
Bretton Woods goal of convertibility and encouraged European and 
Japanese trade protectionism and discrimination against the dollar.  
For example, the United States absorbed large volumes of Japanese 
exports while accepting Japanese restrictions against American 
exports.  It supported the European Payments Union, an intra 
European clearing system which discriminated against the dollar.  And 
it promoted European and Japanese exports to the United States…To 
encourage long-term adjustment, the United States promoted European 
and Japanese trade competitiveness.  Policies for economic controls on 
the defeated Axis countries were scrapped.  Aid to Europe and Japan 
was designed to rebuild productive and export capacity.  In the long 
run it was expected that such European and Japanese recovery would 
benefit the United States by widening markets for American exports.   
(Spero (1977) p.37) (emphasis added). 
 
The challenge for the international community today is whether the advanced 
countries are willing to follow enlightened long-term international economic policies 
similar to those pioneered by the United States in the Golden Age.  These policies 
were evidently highly successful both for the U.S. and its allies and led ultimately to 
the demise of the Soviet Union.  The important issue is whether advanced countries, 
not faced with a strategic threat from another superpower are willing voluntarily to 
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sacrifice short-term and transient trade advantages for long-term economic policy that 
would benefit developing countries as well as themselves. 
 
 
IX The Case for Special and differential Treatment for Developing 
Countries:  A Summary. 
 
The analysis of the previous sections has indicated that simply integrating developing 
countries with varying degrees of economic weaknesses in a multilateral world 
trading system is unlikely to lead by itself to economic development.  Evidence from 
the developmental experience of various countries during the last half century or 
more, as well as economic analysis, suggest that the optimal degree of openness from 
the perspective of economic development varies between countries.  Moreover, as 
Rodrik rightly argues, capitalism may be the only viable system in the world, but a 
wide variety of institutional arrangements are compatible with capitalism.  To bring 
about sustainable economic development, developing countries need to have policy 
autonomy so that they can create their own institutions best suited to their needs.  This 
type of choice is precisely what effectively becomes seriously circumscribed under 
the multilateral trading arrangements of the WTO.27
 
Equally importantly, developing countries are unable to employ the variety of policy 
instruments used effectively as seen above by both developing and developed 
countries during the post world war II period to enhance their economic development. 
These notably include industrial policies employed in many Asian countries with 
outstanding results. These restrictions on government policy space under the WTO 
Agreements might not be regarded as a handicap if it is maintained that in most 
developing countries government failure is more important than market failure and so 
countries are better off in a regime where their governments cannot intervene. This 
may appear to be a plausible argument but one which flies in the face of evidence. 
Governments in China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and in many 
                                                 
27 Strictly speaking, WTO Agreements do not prohibit establishing new institutions as such.  What 
these do is to place limitations on a country’s policies and legal framework.  The latter are compatible 
with some institutional arrangements and not with others which unnecessarily restricts many DC’s 
policy autonomy and their ability to establish important development friendly institutions. 
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other developing countries have long overall records of successful government 
interventions, poverty reduction and economic development.28 These countries have 
effective governments which are involved in carrying out myriad developmental 
tasks. 
 
At a developmental level the WTO Agreements have arguably been a colossal 
mistake.  Rodrik is rightly scathing in his indictment: 
 
The rules for admission into the world economy not only reflect little 
awareness of development priorities they are often completely unrelated 
to sensible economic principles.  WTO rules on anti-dumping, subsidies 
and countervailing measures, agriculture, textiles, trade related 
investment measures (TRIMS) and trade related intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS) are utterly devoid of any economic rationale beyond the 
mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful groups in the advanced 
industrial countries.  The developmental pay-off of most of these 
requirements is hard to see.  Rodrik (2001) p.27. 
 
Moreover, developing countries had to pay heavily for the privilege of joining 
this anti-development club.  World Bank (2002) estimates that it costs a typical 
developing country $US1.5 million in start up costs and $US2 million in annual 
recurrent costs to implement a single WTO agreement, namely the TRIPs. These 
expenses are onerous for many developing countries.  
 
Developing countries signed up to WTO agreements on which they were 
evidently not properly consulted. The implications of the Agreements for 
economic development were not spelled out. The euphoria of developing 
countries over the demand for the New International Economic Order in the 
1970s had given way in the 1980s to a debt crisis in Latin America and Africa 
which reduced many of these countries to the status of being supplicants before 
the International Financial Institutions.  The political weaknesses of developing 
                                                 
28  See further Amsden (2001), for a discussion of why in some countries government interventions 
succeed  and in other they do not . 
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countries were also noted earlier. These, plus the pressure from IFIs under the 
structural adjustment programs, obliged these countries to accept what many of 
them knew to be development unfriendly Agreements.   
 
At a global level it is important to note that developing countries already suffer from 
an additional structural handicap compared with the pre-globalization period.  In part 
as a consequence of trade liberalization and lowered tariffs on imported foreign 
consumer goods, research indicates that developing countries are experiencing surges 
in imports.  This results in their becoming balance of payments constrained at a 
systematically slower growth rate than used to be the case before.29 To finance their 
current account deficits, countries often open up their capital account.  This perhaps 
helps in the short term but over the medium term many countries have unhappy 
results with these capital accounts openings.  (The latter issue is discussed further in 
section XIII.) 
 
Significantly, the current account disequilibria of the kind outlined above can be 
rectified in other ways, without resorting to premature capital account liberalization 
and risking financial fragility. One important trade-as well as-development friendly 
way to do this would be to allow DCs again a balance of payments let-out clause (as 
in GATT)  which would permit them to control directly  the level and growth rate of 
their imports (including using quantitative controls if necessary).   Permitting DCs 
this additional measure of economic autonomy would mean that the affected country 
does not necessarily have to reduce its level or its rate of growth of GDP, in order to 
reduce the level and the growth rates of imports. S&DT provisions of this kind in 
favour of DCs would thus benefit both the North and the South by reducing the costs 
of adjustments of temporary balance of payments disequilibria.  
 
To sum up, in view of the evident anti-development bias of the many WTO 
Agreements, a very large degree of special and differential treatment would be needed 
to redress the balance. There is ample historical evidence, not least from developed 
countries themselves that a reasonably high and predictable degree of special and 
differential treatment can assist economic development.  Such S&DT could also be in 
                                                 
29 See further UNCTAD (2000) 
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the long-term interest of developed countries as outlined below. This is in part 
because a prosperous developing world provides a greater market for advanced 
country goods which in turn leads to higher incomes and production in the North.  
This generates a greater demand for imports from the South, a positive feedback loop 
and a virtuous circle of cumulative causation and higher incomes in both North and 
South than would otherwise be the case.  However, the resulting growth path is 
unstable, implying a fragility of the positive feedback loop.  The latter could easily go 
into reverse in a vicious circle if, for example, higher incomes in both regions lead to 
an increase in commodity prices, or there is a wage-price spiral in the labour markets 
in the North.  To avoid this vicious circle, it will be necessary to establish long-term 
restraining institutions, both nationally (e.g. pay co-ordination policies) and 
internationally (e.g. commodity price stabilization policies) to deliver mutually 
supportive fast economic growth in both the North and the South, as occurred in the 
Golden Age.30 
 
 
PART II. POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
X. Introduction: Alternative Policy Approaches to S & DT 
 
The terms of paragraph 44 of Doha Ministerial Declaration on S&DT as well as other 
references to the latter provisions elsewhere in the Declaration can be interpreted in 
two diametrically opposite ways. The first interpretation would take the text at its face 
value and regard the fulsome endorsement of the S&DT and the mandate to 
rationalize and operationalize the concept as indicating a real desire on the part of 
ACs to make S&DT the cornerstone of a Doha Developmental Round. In short, this 
interpretation would suggest a genuine call for new thinking on S&DT issues to 
address the developmental concerns of emerging countries in the WTO system. 
 
The second and opposite interpretation of the references to S&DT in the Doha 
Declaration, is to reject these as another cynical attempt by ACs to mislead DCs by 
putting before them the prospect of strengthened S&DT when they do not intend to do 
                                                 
30 For a more comprehensive discussion of these issues see Kaldor’s (1976) classic paper,  Singh 
(1995a) and Singh and Zammit (2000). 
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any thing other than to induce DCs to accept the full rigours of the WTO system, as 
well as to adopt the system of “graduation” which would be deeply divisive for DCs. 
 
Although there is considerable past and present history to support the second 
interpretation, this paper takes the more optimistic first view so as to make a 
constructive contribution to the current North South discussions on these issues, 
which are taking place in Geneva and elsewhere. This broader and positive approach 
to S&DT provisions has also been implicitly called for by the heads of governments 
or states of non-aligned countries, who met in Kuala Lumpur recently. In relation to 
the current WTO negotiations the heads were “particularly concerned that major 
trading partners have yet again sought to place the question of S&DT for developing 
countries at a level less than at par with the other aspects of the negotiations.” They 
called for “immediate negotiations on the proposed Framework Agreement on Special 
and Differential Treatment for developing countries during the course of the present 
negotiations and reaffirmed that S&DT applies to all developing countries” (Koh 
2003). 
 
XI. Towards a Development Friendly WTO Regime 
 
It would be useful to begin the policy analysis by considering first the most optimistic 
policy scenario from the perspective of DCs. In this hypothetical world ACs decide to 
act in an anti-mercantilist mode of the post World War II US economic policy 
described earlier. In this mode the anti-developmental aspects of TRIPS, TRIMS, 
subsidies, balance of payments’ provisions, as well as other relevant parts of WTO 
Agreements would be openly acknowledged and the DCs (but not the ACs) would be 
allowed to opt out of any of these components if this is desired. This may appear to be 
a huge change with respect to the current situation, but it is worth remembering that 
the hypothesized conditions represent in many ways no more than the GATT 
privileges and protections which were available to DC in the pre-Uruguay round 
period. During the 1960s and 1970s, as Hoekman et.al.(2003) put it, DC members 
were able to enjoy GATT on an à la carte basis. Further in this imagined development 
friendly world developing countries would have preferential access to advanced 
countries’ markets without being obliged to open their own markets in return. Thus, 
under the assumed circumstances, S&DT provisions in different areas help create an 
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environment conducive to economic development: DCs are provided with the policy 
autonomy and the means and instruments for achieving their developmental priorities. 
 
Would such a world, where S&DT takes what some would regard, this extreme form, 
necessarily harm economic development in developed countries? The theoretical 
answer in terms of neo-classical analysis is to suggest that such asymmetric 
integration of developing countries with the world economy would not prejudice 
economic growth and jobs in ACs.  However, such a theoretical response is unlikely 
to cut much ice with the advanced countries’ policy makers who would say that 
although in principle trade is not a zero sum game, the presence of many advanced 
developing countries with low wages and poor working conditions provides unfair 
competition and threatens the survival of many of their industries. There can be 
sudden surges of imports from leading DCs which harm workers in ACs. Policy 
makers in ACs would go on to suggest that they maybe willing to provide some or all 
of these concessions to the Least Developed Countries but there has to be some 
progression, a “graduation” level, beyond which S&DT would no longer be 
appropriate. However, a contrary view is expressed in the NAM Declaration above, 
with the heads of governments or states of DCs reaffirming “that S&DT applies to all 
DCs”. Hence the question of graduation is a major point of contention between ACs 
and DCs and it deserves careful examination. 
 
XII. Graduation and Differentiation:  a Mercantilist misconception 
 
It was suggested by the analysis in Part I that the optimal degree of openness differs 
between countries, developing and developed, as well as within each of these country 
groups. In terms of the application of S&DT to DCs that would suggest a case by case 
approach to each country. This would however at the present stage of development of 
the multilateral trading system be extremely expensive in terms of either trust or in 
more orthodox financial terms of costs and is therefore likely to be impractical. Hence 
the South view that all DCs should benefit from S&DT and there should be no 
“graduation”. The significant issue here, which may help towards a resolution of this 
controversy, concerns how much extra costs if any, would developed countries have 
to bear if the S&DT provisions were not confined to least developed countries but 
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were given to all developing countries. Would the costs of greater universality of 
S&DT provisions be prohibitively high for developed countries? 
 
In a recent important World Bank study (Hoekman et al., 2003) on the S&DT 
controversy, the distinguished authors argue: “Defining (agreeing to) the criteria to 
determine eligibility for S&DT lies at the heart of the S&DT debate. The experience 
to date suggests that the depth of the differential treatment granted will be inversely 
related to the number of eligible countries. Eligibility for S&DT should be restricted 
to fewer WTO member countries than is currently the case under the self-declaration 
approach that is used to identify developing countries.” The authors however, do not 
provide any economic justification for their advocacy of selection rather than 
universality in the granting of S&DT treatments to DCs. Yet, this issue is central to 
the dispute. For if the cost of universality were zero or negative or even a positive 
number which was small, it would be difficult to maintain a case for selectivity in 
favour of simply the Least Developed Countries and small number of other similar 
countries, as suggested by Hoekman et al., 2003. For if universality has no net 
economic cost to the ACs, their insistence on selectivity would be regarded by DCs as 
simply a political device to create divisions among their ranks. 
 
 It is therefore, important in relation to the “graduation” issue to estimate the net costs 
and benefits to ACs of the international trading system which up to now has been 
mainly working on a universalist criterion of self-declaration as a DC in relation to 
S&DT matters.31  There are no studies which directly compare a universalist S&DT 
regime with a selective one. There is nevertheless, a large body of analysis and 
indirect evidence which bears on the issue of the costs and benefits of the present 
trading system to ACs. The relevant parts of this literature32 concerns the effects of 
North South trade in manufacture on labour market outcomes (in terms of 
unemployment, wage dispersion and de-industrialization) in the North. This literature 
is highly contentious, albeit more in terms of methodology than with respect to the 
results. Until recently, the general empirical conclusion of this body of research wars 
                                                 
31 There are parts of WTO agreements in addition to S&DT, where a reference to least developed 
group is made but such references are few and far between. Generally speaking, statement in the text is 
correct that the main beneficiaries of S&DT are supposed to be DCs. 
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that the ACs manufacturing trade with DCs during the 1980s was responsible for 
about 20% of the observed wage dispersion in the US. It was also thought to 
contribute to de-industrialization and unemployment on a similar modest scale.33 
Most of the observed negative changes in the labour market outcomes in the North 
have been ascribed to technology.  
 
 Most researchers accept the view that the proximate cause of labour market outcomes 
in the North, is the fall in the demand for un-skilled labour which is ascribed to either 
trade or technology. Prof. Sir Tony Atkinson (1999, 2000, 2001) refers to this 
common view as the transatlantic consensus, since it provides a unified explanation 
for both unemployment in Western Europe and inequality in income distribution in 
the US. It does so by making the auxiliary assumption that labour markets in Western 
Europe are highly imperfect because of the welfare state, so that reduced demand for 
unskilled labour leads to unemployment rather than reduced wages. However in the 
US, the flexible labour market prevents unemployment at the expense of unfavourable 
changes in wage distribution. 
 
Be that as it may, the most recent research on the subject which covers the data for   
the 1990s produces radically different conclusions. It suggests that neither trade nor 
technology can explain the observed changes, either in income distribution in the US 
or in unemployment in Europe. Macroeconomic factors, unionisation and variables 
such as social norms have been deemed to be more important than either trade of 
technology, in explaining the observed changes in the 1990s. 
 
Equally significantly, empirical studies of the effects of trade and technology on AC 
labour markets, do not take into account changes in terms of trade, which are 
connected with the trade with the South and which have a highly positive effect on the 
welfare in the North. To illustrate, the large devaluations that occurred in the crisis 
affected Asian countries as a consequence of the acute macro-economic disturbances 
in the region in the 1997 to 2000, did not cause serious difficulties for US industry as 
                                                                                                                                            
32 For recent review of this literature see Slaughter and Swagel (1997), Atkinson (1999, 2000, 2001), 
Singh (2003), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997). 
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was expected. Instead, improvements in terms of trade helped reduce inflation in the 
US which enabled the Federal Reserve to run the economy at a higher level of output 
and employment than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
The above analysis suggests that, provided import surges can be controlled by 
multilaterally agreed safeguard measures, there are unlikely to be significant net 
economic costs to ACs of allowing a universalist S&DT regime in DCs. In view of 
this, it is not surprising that the DCs view the AC emphasis on graduation and 
differentiation as being politically motivated and designed to create further divisions 
among the DCs.  Since there is a vast gap between countries in their relative political 
and economic strengths, more divisions among developing countries would further 
reduce their bargaining power in a uni-polar world, and lead to even greater 
imbalances between the North and the South. 
 
To sum up, the North’s insistence on graduation and differentiation is a mercantilist 
misconception from which it needs to be weaned away, so that attention can be 
focused on the real and substantive issues of the kinds of S&DT which would best 
help emerging countries.  
 
XIII Trade, Finance and the Global Economy 
 
While the attention of developing country policy makers is concentrated on the WTO 
and the Doha Round, much of the relevant action is taking place elsewhere - in the 
financial sphere.  There is unfortunately no reprieve for developing countries in that 
sphere either from the pursuit of short-term economic advantage and mercantilism of 
the ACs.  In some ways the situation is worse.  As noted in Part I, in view of the high 
propensity to import of emerging markets, relaxation of the import controls via trade 
liberalization has been closely connected with balance of payments difficulties. These 
difficulties oblige these countries to seek financial liberalization. The experience of 
developing countries with financial liberalization during the last decade has been 
catastrophic.  A vast literature has explored the theoretical and empirical reasons for 
                                                                                                                                            
33However, Wood (1994) regards North-South manufacturing trade to be a major cause of the adverse 
labour market outcomes in the North.  For alternative perspectives see the references cited in footnote 
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the financial crises that have invariably followed financial liberalization rather than 
consumption smoothing which text book theory would predict.34
 
The Bretton Woods institutions were established following the end of World War II in 
order precisely to reduce such instability in the global and national economies.  In 
practice, the International Monetary Fund has shown no stomach for disciplining its 
most powerful members whose macro-economic policies often do collateral damage 
in developing countries35.  Indeed, the Fund has effectively been used by leading 
industrial countries exclusively as a way of disciplining the Third World.  Advanced 
countries, over nearly the last two decades (specifically since the Plaza Agreement of 
1985), have maintained the minimum degree of economic cooperation between 
themselves so as not to provoke price wars through competitive devaluations and 
deflations which characterized the 1930s.  This has left developing countries 
increasingly at the mercy of highly unstable financial markets.  Recent research 
indicates that developing countries suffer from much greater instability than 
developed countries, and further that this phenomenon is not due to greater labour 
market rigidities in developing countries (as economic theory would suggest), but 
rather it is due to the nature of the financial systems in developing countries as well as 
fluctuations in developing countries’ terms of trade36. 
 
Hence, developing countries require a special and differential treatment not just at the 
WTO but also at the IMF.  Until the Asian crisis, what they were getting instead at the 
IMF were strong exhortations to liberalize not just their current accounts but also their 
capital accounts.  In 1997, the IMF attempted to change its Articles of Agreement to 
make capital account liberalization one of the main objectives of the organization.  
The Asian crisis brought some restraint and pull-back from these proposals.  Professor 
Stiglitz(2000) Nobel Laureate and former Chief Economist of the World Bank, found 
striking “the zeal with which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had requested an 
                                                                                                                                            
32.  See also Singh’s (1995c) review of Wood. 
34 For a fuller discussion and recent reviews, see Singh (2002), Stiglitz (2000), Feldstein (2002). 
However, for a defense of capital account liberalization see Summers (2000) and Fischer (1997). 
35 For example, the interest rate shock of the late 1970s, which was a consequence of major changes in 
US monetary policy in 1979 under the then Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Paul Volker. This had 
devastating consequences for developing countries leading eventually to the ‘lost’ decade of the 1980s 
in Africa and Latin America. See further Fishlow (1991) and Singh (1993). 
36 See further Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000). 
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extension of its mandate to include capital market liberalization a short two years 
earlier at the Annual Meetings in Hong Kong.  It should have been clear then, and it is 
certainly clear now, that the position was maintained either as a matter of ideology or 
of special interests, and not on the basis of careful analysis of theory, historical 
experience or a wealth of econometric studies.  Indeed it has become increasingly 
clear that there is not only no case for capital market liberalization, but that there is a 
fairly compelling case against full liberalization” (page 1076). 
 
It is therefore not surprising that although there has been an intellectual retreat from 
the Washington Consensus policies by the Fund and the Bank(as noted in Part I), in 
practice it is widely felt that these policies haven’t fundamentally changed but have 
simply been given a new name (for example, poverty reduction strategy)37.  Similarly, 
it is disappointing that, notwithstanding all the pious references to S&DT in the Doha 
Declaration, the ground reality is that any such considerations are being blatantly 
ignored in the negotiations on services modalities which have recently been agreed.  
WTO’s press note of 10 March, 2003 reports the following decisions of the Council 
for Trade and Services in relation to liberalization of services in developing countries. 
 
13. Pursuant to the objectives of the GATS, as stipulated in the 
Preamble, Article IV, and Article XIX:2, and in line with paragraph 
2 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, these modalities shall be used 
inter alia as a means of promoting the economic growth and 
development of developing countries and their increasing 
participation in trade in services. 
 
14. In the application of these modalities, and in recognizing and 
granting credit pursuant to these modalities, Members shall take 
fully into account the flexibility provided for individual developing 
country Members under the provisions referred to in paragraph 13 
above, as well as the level of development of developing country 
Members in relation to other Members.  Special consideration shall 
be given to the least-developed country Members. 
                                                 
37 For a strong re-affirmation of the Washington consensus policies see Aninat (2003) 
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There is clearly no new concept of S&DT here.  The juggernaut of precipitate 
liberalization rolls on regardless of the anti-developmental effects that such 
liberalization entails for developing countries as suggested by the analysis in Part I of 
this paper. 
 
 
In endorsing S&DT in glowing terms, the Doha Ministerial Meeting provided the 
international community with an opportunity to make the concept of Special and 
Differential Treatment meaningful and use it as an instrument to correct the structural 
imbalances between developed and developing countries. However, as the example of 
services above shows, no such new thinking is actually permeating the normal WTO 
processes. Liberalization of trade, whether in goods or services, without any 
assessment of the developmental consequences of such liberalization still seems to be 
the order of the day. However, unlike the trade in goods, precipitate liberalization in 
the banking and financial sectors of services carries with it serious dangers to the 
stability of the economy. Before a country undertakes such liberalization it requires a 
well functioning regulatory mechanism to provide prudent regulations. Alexander 
(2003) has argued that in the rush to liberalize the banking and financial services of 
the WTO, these elementary but exceptionally important requirements of prudential 
regulation are being ignored. 
 
This last point has recently been forcefully argued by Bhagwati and Tarullo (2003). 
They refer specifically to the US government’s recent RTA with Chile and Singapore. 
The Bush administration has insisted that the two countries will not be permitted to 
use capital controls against American firms. This, the reader will recall, is the exact 
opposite of the effective Special and Differential Treatment that the United States 
offered after the war to the European countries. These countries, within the 
framework of the European payments union were able to discriminate against the US 
dollar in favour of the local currency. 
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Bhagwati and Tarullo observe: 
 
‘Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 the IMF has changed its thinking 
and acknowledged the need for careful policies that monitor and, in some 
cases, regulate capital flows. 
 
Yet now, just as the world has become saner in these matters, the Bush 
administration has insisted that the free trade areas for Chile and Singapore 
include provisions penalizing them for the use of any controls on capital. This 
short-sighted view marks a discouraging triumph of ideology over experience 
and good sense.’ 
 
The two authors are worried that the Bush administration may use these two 
agreements (with Chile and Singapore) as templates for other trade agreements, 
possibly including the Doha round.  
 
 
XIV   Conclusion: S&DT and Economic Development 
The unequivocal endorsement of S&DT at Doha gives the international community a 
fresh chance to change course, to put economic development at the heart of the 
agenda for the current and future evolution of the multilateral trading system. In 
operational terms this would indicate not only that internationally agreed poverty 
reduction goals are met, but that a movement towards convergence in income and 
productivity levels with rich countries is regarded as a legitimate objective which 
poor countries shall have the right, and be provided with the opportunity and the 
ability to pursue. Taking development goals seriously in this manner would require a 
new definition and a new conceptualization of S&DT than the narrow meaning given 
to it under the Uruguay Round and the WTO Agreements. This new conceptualization 
of S&DT should satisfy the following broad concerns of DCs. 
 
(a) There are parts of WTO Agreements which do not advance the cause of 
development and, arguably, restrict it. Reference here is to TRIMs, TRIPs, 
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Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Anti-dumping and other similar 
measures38. These Agreements need to be re-negotiated and, if they cannot 
be satisfactorily amended developing countries should have the right to opt 
out of  these. Indeed, what is being suggested here is that in terms of 
Hoekman et al(2003) developing countries should be allowed to indulge in 
the cardinal sin of participating in the multilateral trading system on the 
basis of ‘GATT a la carte’ as it were. 
 
(b) Not only is it necessary to recognize the imbalances and anti-development 
character of the existing WTO Agreements but, equally importantly it is 
essential to ensure that S&DT of DCs is made a part and parcel of the 
liberalization of Services and of other areas, as well as in the consideration 
of  new disciplines (eg. the Singapore issues) on which negotiations are 
taking place now or are likely  in the foreseeable  future. Again if DCs 
concerns on these issues cannot be met within the framework of existing 
Agreements they should be permitted to opt out. 
 
The achievement of (a) and (b) above depends on the ACs being weaned away from 
their insistance on graduation and differentiation, which this paper has argued is a 
mercantilist misconception. Indeed, this entire programme of putting development at 
the centre stage in WTO negotiations requires a sea change in the culture and conduct 
of such negotiations which at present appears to be steeped in narrow mercatilism 
rather than any long-term vision of a trading system which benefits both rich and poor 
countries. The AC negotiators should not forget that trade is not a zero sum game, and 
their countries themselves provide an outstanding example of the success of non-
reciprocity in international trade and finance. As suggested in Part I of the paper in 
the golden Age 1950-73 the farsighted  economic policies of the US which sought 
                                                 
38 For fuller discussion of how the various parts of the WTO Agreements disadvantage developing 
countries and discourage development see Third World Network (2001), Oxfam (2002) 
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long-term objectives rather than short-term gains were spectacularly successful in 
building up most of Europe and Japan as show pieces of liberal capitalism. 
 
The challenge ACs face today is whether they are willing to take a similar long term 
view in their trade and financial relationships with developing countries and whether 
or not they will  be able to overcome the narrow mercantilist outlook which demands 
reciprocity. The ball is squarely in the court of the ACs as only they have the 
economic power to determine the world economic priorities and agenda. 
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